Proponents of deflationism about meaning often claim that the principle of compositionality, when properly understood, places no constraint whatsoever on the nature of lexical meaning. This deflationary thesis admits of both strong and weak readings. On the strong reading, the principle does not rule out any theory of lexical meaning either alone or in conjunction with other independently plausible semantic assumptions. On the weak reading, the principle alone does not rule out any such theory. I argue that, though weak (...) deflationism about compositionality has better initial prospects than strong, neither version of the thesis is credible. In particular, weak deflationism cannot be maintained in conformity with the deflationist commitment to explaining facts about phrase meanings in compositional terms, that is, by appeal to facts about the lexicon. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this commentary I evaluate what McGowan’s project would conclude with respect to the treatment of professional Australian Football League player Adam Goodes, who was incessantly ‘booed’ by crowds for the final two years of his career. Analysing Goodes’ case in light of McGowan’s argument leads me to two observations. First, McGowan’s norm-enactment approach is incredibly useful because it explains how words like ‘boo’ (with unstable meaning) can constitute actionable discrimination. Second, however, I wonder if a narrow focus (...) on whether such speech is legally actionable might encourage an overestimation of the power of laws to shepherd new g-norms into social practices. (shrink)

This informal position paper brings together some recent developments in formal semantics and pragmatics to argue that the discipline of Game Theory is well placed to become the theoretical backbone of Natural Language Generation. To demonstrate some of the strengths and weaknesses of the Game-Theoretical approach, we focus on the utility of vague expressions. More specifically, we ask what light Game Theory can shed on the question when an NLG system should generate vague language.

In many countries attention for fostering research integrity started with a misconduct case that got a lot of media exposure. But there is an emerging consensus that questionable research practices are more harmful due to their high prevalence. QRPs have in common that they can help to make study results more exciting, more positive and more statistically significant. That makes them tempting to engage in. Research institutions have the duty to empower their research staff to steer away from QRPs and (...) to explain how they realize that in a Research Integrity Promotion Plan. Avoiding perverse incentives in assessing researchers for career advancement is an important element in that plan. Research institutions, funding agencies and journals should make their research integrity policies as evidence-based as possible. The dilemmas and distractions researchers face are real and universal. We owe it to society to collaborate and to do our utmost best to prevent QRPs and to foster research integrity. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Designing Academic Conferences as a Learning Environment: How to Stimulate Active Learning at Academic Conferences?” by Johan Verbeke. Upshot: The commentary starts with a critical approach towards the concept of knowledge in artistic research. I argue that without transforming the conceptual outline of knowledge production by taking sensuous and more-than-human elements into account, experimental formats for learning environments will be undermined. The comment closes with a constructivist and speculative proposition for the future planning of (...) creative practice events. (shrink)

The reason Descartes cites for invoking the demon argument in addition to the dream argument is that the demon argument is intended to broaden the scope of Descartes’ scepticism, to subsume additional beliefs under it. I present an additional, unfamiliar reason. There is, I argue, an important difference between the two sceptical arguments. It pertains not to their scope, but to their “depth”, to the kind of scepticism they are capable of inducing.

In this paper I argue that demonstrative induction can deal with the problem ofthe underdetermination of theory by evidence. I present the historical case studyof spectroscopy in the early 1920s, where the choice among different theorieswas apparently underdetermined by spectroscopic evidence concerning the alkalidoublets and their anomalous Zeeman effect. By casting this historical episodewithin the methodological framework of demonstrative induction, the localunderdetermination among Bohr's, Heisenberg's, and Pauli's rival theories isresolved in favour of Pauli's theory of the electron's spin.

The apparent chasm between two camps in metaphysics, analytic metaphysics and scientific metaphysics, is well recognized. I argue that the relationship between them is not necessarily a rivalry; a division of labour that resembles the relationship between pure mathematics and science is possible. As a case study, I look into the metaphysical underdetermination argument for ontic structural realism, a well‐known position in scientific metaphysics, together with an argument for the position in analytic metaphysics known as ontological nihilism. I argue that (...) we can ascribe the same schema to both arguments, which indicates that analytic metaphysics can offer an abstract model that scientific metaphysics may find useful. (shrink)

A Critique of Artificial Reason Hubert L. Dreyfus . HUBERT L. DREYFUS What Computers Still Can't Do Thi s One XZKQ-GSY-8KDG What. WHAT COMPUTERS STILL CAN'T DO Front Cover.

Place is central to many research projects in the social sciences, but it is often taken by researchers as a given. Recently, discourse analysts have devoted more attention to the construction of place in interaction. We focus on one aspect of this construction, the process of drawing inferences from place categories and place names, in transcripts of oral history interviews. We apply membership categorization analysis to descriptions of house types and houses, showing how some categories are presented as being shared (...) and recognizable, and how inferences are projected. Then we apply a similar approach to the ways inferences are drawn from place names, focusing especially on proximity. Participants’ categories can be investigated by examining the ways they are used in question–answer pairs, and in the construction of turns using elaborations, contrasting pairs, negatives and qualifications. This analysis shows the work these place references do for the participants, for instance, in categorizing themselves and others and giving accounts for behaviour. (shrink)

One of the main motivations for having a compositional semantics is the account of the productivity of natural languages. Formal languages are often part of the account of productivity, i.e., of how beings with finite capaci- ties are able to produce and understand a potentially infinite number of sen- tences, by offering a model of this process. This account of productivity con- sists in the generation of proofs in a formal system, that is taken to represent the way speakers grasp (...) the meaning of an indefinite number of sentences. The informational basis is restricted to what is represented in the lexicon. This constraint is considered as a requirement for the account of productivity, or at least of an important feature of productivity, namely, that we can grasp auto- matically the meaning of a huge number of complex expressions, far beyond what can be memorized. However, empirical results in psycholinguistics, and especially particular patterns of ERP, show that the brain integrates informa- tion of different sources very fast, without any felt effort on the part of the speaker. This shows that formal procedures do not explain productivity. How- ever, formal models are still useful in the account of how we get at the seman- tic value of a complex expression, once we have the meanings of its parts, even if there is no formal explanation of how we get at those meanings. A practice-oriented view of modeling gives an adequate interpretation of this re- sult: formal compositional semantics may be a useful model for some ex- planatory purposes concerning natural languages, without being a good model for dealing with other explananda. (shrink)

Suszko’s problem is the problem of finding the minimal number of truth values needed to semantically characterize a syntactic consequence relation. Suszko proved that every Tarskian consequence relation can be characterized using only two truth values. Malinowski showed that this number can equal three if some of Tarski’s structural constraints are relaxed. By so doing, Malinowski introduced a case of so-called mixed consequence, allowing the notion of a designated value to vary between the premises and the conclusions of an argument. (...) In this article we give a more systematic perspective on Suszko’s problem and on mixed consequence. First, we prove general representation theorems relating structural properties of a consequence relation to their semantic interpretation, uncovering the semantic counterpart of substitution-invariance, and establishing that mixed consequence is fundamentally the semantic counterpart of the structural property of monotonicity. We use those theorems to derive maximum-rank results proved recently in a different setting by French and Ripley, as well as by Blasio, Marcos, and Wansing, for logics with various structural properties. We strengthen these results into exact rank results for nonpermeable logics. We discuss the underlying notion of rank, and the associated reduction proposed independently by Scott and Suszko. As emphasized by Suszko, that reduction fails to preserve compositionality in general, meaning that the resulting semantics is no longer truth-functional. We propose a modification of that notion of reduction, allowing us to prove that over compact logics with what we call regular connectives, rank results are maintained even if we request the preservation of truth-functionality and additional semantic properties. (shrink)

A recurrent problem in Spinoza's ethical and political philosophy is what beings can do, what their affects are, and how these affects may be diminished or enhanced. This paper focuses on Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise to examine how natural and positive law engages a constitutive relationship with our affective capacity or, in Spinoza's language, our modal power and conatus. This paper begins with a critique of interpretations of Spinoza as a precursor of liberal political and juridical philosophies, and proceeds (...) to argue that far from grounding a stable polity in individual right, law and natural right, Spinoza establishes a political landscape without finalist significance and in pursuit of an embodied activity of establishing new affects. Law in Spinoza will be seen not as a duty or a constraint but as a measure and an exercise of affectivity and power, a productive and phenomenological force that casts human affects into creative and unforeseeable figurations. (shrink)

This paper presents a practical case study showing how, despite the nowadays limited collaboration between AI and Cognitive Science (CogSci), cognitive research can still have an important role in the development of novel AI technologies. After a brief historical introduction about the reasons of the divorce between AI and CogSci research agendas (happened in the mid’80s of the last century), we try to provide evidence of a renewed collaboration by showing a recent case study on a commonsense reasoning system, built (...) by using insights from cognitive semantics. (shrink)

On a bilateralist reading, sequents are interpreted as statements to the effect that, given the assertion of the antecedent it is incoherent to deny the succedent. This interpretation goes against its own ecumenical ambitions, endowing Cut with a meaning very close to that of tertium non datur and thus rendering it intuitionistically unpalatable. This paper explores a top-down route for arguing that, even intuitionistically, a prohibition to deny is as strong as a licence to assert.

Some of a person's mental states have the power to represent real and imagined states of affairs: they have semantic properties. What Minds Can Do has two goals: to find a naturalistic or non-semantic basis for the representational powers of a person's mind, and to show that these semantic properties are involved in the causal explanation of the person's behaviour. In the process, this 1997 book addresses issues that are central to much contemporary philosophical debate. It will be of (...) interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy of mind and of language, cognitive science, and psychology. (shrink)

Throughout much of his career, Deleuze repeats a problem he attributes to Spinoza: “we do not even know what a body can do.” The problem is closely associated with Deleuze’s parallelist reading of Spinoza and what he calls ethology. In this article, I argue that Deleuze takes ethology to be a new model for philosophy which he intends to replace ontology. I ground my claim in Deleuze’s sugges-tion that Spinoza offers philosophers the means of “thinking with AND” rather (...) than “thinking for IS.” The argument is developed through Deleuze’s monographs and collaborations on Spinoza and alongside his meta-philosophical critique of the Image of Thought. (shrink)

Throughout much of his career, Deleuze repeats a problem he attributes to Spinoza: “we do not even know what a body can do.” The problem is closely associated with Deleuze’s parallelist reading of Spinoza and what he calls ethology. In this article, I argue that Deleuze takes ethology to be a new model for philosophy which he intends to replace ontology. I ground my claim in Deleuze’s suggestion that Spinoza offers philosophers the means of thinking “with AND rather (...) than thinking for IS...” The argument is developed through Deleuze’s monographs and collaborations on Spinoza and alongside his meta-philosophical critique of the Image of Thought. -/- A travers la plupart de sa carrière, Deleuze répète un problème qu'il attribue à Spinoza : « on ne sait même pas ce que peut le corps. » Le problème est étroitement lié à paralléliste lecture de Spinoza par Deleuze et à ce qu’il appelle éthologie. Dans cet article, je soutiens que Deleuze prend éthologie être un nouveau modèle de philosophie qu’il entend remplacer l’ontologie. Je centre mon contention sur la suggestion de Deleuze que Spinoza propose des philosophes les moyens de « penser avec ET au lieu de penser pour EST… » L’argument est développé à travers les monographies et collaborations de Deleuze sur Spinoza et aux côtés de sa critique méta-philosophique de l’Image de la Pensée. (shrink)

(1988). Platonic explanation: Or, what abstract entities can do for you. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 51-67. doi: 10.1080/02698598808573324.

This essay is about how artists, listeners and critics claim to hear life in a sound and how this suggestive, but hazily defined, provocation connects vast cultural circuits of production, technology and capital. I argue that claims to life in a sound also belie an anachronistic return to an early modern understanding of sound as particulate matter and suggest a technoscientific discourse in which sound and data are described in terms of one another. With a close engagement with microsounds – (...) from Gilles Deleuze to computer music specialist Curtis Roads – this essay queries what sonic particulates are presumed to be when they are mapped onto Spinoza’s corpora simplicissima but processed through analogy synthesis or digital tools. In part, this essay tries to speak to a persistent separation of sonic materiality and auditory culture, in music and sound studies in which life in a sound cannot be thought apart from how life is subject to different kinds of extractions. With a return to Spinoza’s physics, this essay also retakes the often sloganized “no one knows what a body can do” to emphasize an ethical recomposition of the text in which to “know” must be as open-ended as “body” is typically emphasized to be. (shrink)

How do questions concerning consciousness and phenomenal experience relate to, or interface with, questions concerning plans, knowledge and intentions? At least in the case of visual experience the relation, we shall argue, is tight. Visual perceptual experience, we shall argue, is fixed by an agent’s direct unmediated knowledge concerning her poise (or apparent poise) over a currently enabled action space. An action space, in this specific sense, is to be understood not as a fine-grained matrix of possibilities for bodily movement, (...) but as a matrix of possibilities for pursuing and accomplishing one’s intentional actions, goals and projects. If this is correct, the links between planning, intention and perceptual experience are tight, while (contrary to some recent accounts invoking the notion of ‘sensorimotor expectations’) the links between embodied activity and perceptual experience, though real, are indirect. What matters is not bodily activity itself, but our practical knowledge (which need not be verbalized or in any way explicit) of our own possibilities for action. Such knowledge, selected, shaped and filtered by the grid of plans, goals, and intentions, plays, we argue, a constitutive role in explaining the content and character of visual perceptual experience. (shrink)

In moral and political philosophy, collective obligations are promising “gap-stoppers” when we find that we need to assert some obligation, but can not plausibly ascribe this obligation to individual agents. Most notably, Bill Wringe and Jesse Tomalty discuss whether the obligations that correspond to socio-economic human rights are held by states or even by humankind at large. The present paper aims to provide a missing piece for these discussions, namely an account of the conditions under which obligations can apply to (...) loose collections of agents that do not qualify as collective agents in their own right. I first explain the notion of joint obligations of loose collections of agents as opposed to collective obligations of collections of agents that are collective agents in their own right, and argue that the conditions under which agents can jointly have obligations are the conditions under which they are jointly able to do what is required. I then build on Virginia Held’s seminal work on the moral responsibility of “random collections” to develop such conditions for joint ability. My discussion shows that collections of individuals can more easily be subject to moral obligations than previously assumed. It also shows that putative joint obligations need to be carefully time-indexed, and that it is largely an empirical question whether a given collection can be subject to a moral obligation to perform a given joint action at a particular time. (shrink)

We comment on the collection of papers inspired by our book Why Machines Will Never Rule the World published in volume 12 (5+6) of the journal Cosmos+Taxis. We summarize the arguments made by the contributors about what we say in the book, and then show where we disagree.

Appeals to the dignity of people with dementia are widespread in the current literature on dementia care. One influential account of dignity in the wider philosophical and bioethical literature that has remained underexplored in the context of dementia care is that of Martha Nussbaum. This paper critically examines Nussbaum’s account of dignity and aims to determine what moral guidance this account can offer for the provision of care to people with dementia. To that end, first, I identify four possible (...) objections to appeals to dignity in dementia care. These objections are (1) redundancy of the dignity talk, (2) exclusionary implications, (3) reliance on (suspect forms of) speciesism and (4) unclear practical implications. Then, I discuss whether, and to what extent, Nussbaum’s account of dignity can overcome these objections. I argue that Nussbaum’s account, in its original form, struggles to overcome the problem of exclusionary implications and consequently the problem of unclear practical implications. I argue for a modified version of Nussbaum’s account of dignity. I demonstrate that this modified version can better overcome all of the four objections, and it provides relatively clearer moral guidance for the provision of care to people with dementia. The modified version of Nussbaum’s account is predicated on a novel dementia-specific model of flourishing, which draws on Kitwood and Bredin’s empirically informed list of indicators of well-being for people with dementia. (shrink)

Political scientists have conventionally assumed that achieving democracy is a one-way ratchet. Only very recently has the question of “democratic backsliding” attracted any research attention. We argue that democratic instability is best understood with tools from complexity science. The explanatory power of complexity science arises from several features of complex systems. Their relevance in the context of democracy is discussed. Several policy recommendations are offered to help stabilize current systems of representative democracy.

A perceptive and evocative mixture of memory, philosophical interrogation, and criticism, the essays in What Light Can Do, finely attuned to the pleasures and pains of being human, are always grounded in the beauty of the material world and ...

The essays that make up my dissertation share a methodological approach that aims to explore the philosophical implications of linguists' accounts of ordinary language use. In particular, all of them focus on epistemic natural language and the implications that linguists' accounts of such language has for epistemology. The first essay focuses on the debate about the norms that govern assertion and shows the ways in which research on natural language evidentiality has direct bearing. This essay uses existing cross-linguistic data about (...) assertions in Quechua and Cheyenne to argue that assertions and the norms that govern them are more complex than allowed for in extant views. What makes Quechua and Cheyenne important is that they allow speakers to assert sentences the content of which they do not believe, or even believe to be false, as long as the sentence contains the right evidential marker. This is a problem for the current theories as they all take belief in the proposition being expressed as a minimal requirement for a speaker to felicitously assert. Given the data, I argue that we should see evidential markers as modifying the norm that is in place governing felicity of the current content. I go on to present three implementations of a context-sensitive norm and argue that only the ones that are evidence-based or completely contextual can properly capture the entire set of linguistic data. In the second essay I argue that epistemic uses of 'should' can be modelling using the standard Kratzerian modal canon. In Kratzer's system, modals induce quantification over some partially ordered, restricted class of worlds. The relevant partially ordered, restricted class of worlds is generally fixed by two ingredients: a modal base and an ordering source. Modelling epistemic uses of 'should' requires us to rethink and expand what has traditionally been thought of as making up an epistemic modal base. Traditionally it has been thought that epistemic modal bases just include information about probabilities but this thought needs to be updated in order to bring epistemic 'should' into the fold. I argue that there are good theoretical reasons for having as uniform a semantics as possible then show that the context-sensitive semantic model that I develop meets all empirical demands. I end the essay by arguing that this updated way of thinking about epistemic modals bases has implications for epistemology. The final essay outlines the broad type of methodological approach mentioned above that guides the research throughout the dissertation. In it, I argue that the results of linguistics' theorizing about semantics, especially within the epistemic domain, ought to be seen as an accurate guide to reality. Looking to the way that language evolves over time and what it takes for information to become encoded into language is what drives this result. Buttressing the evolutionary explanation with results from the Condorcet Jury Theorem gives us more reason to believe that language is an accurate, albeit defeasible, guide to reality. If these results hold, they not only have broad implications for how we ought to be conducting our epistemological theorizing but our philosophical theorizing in general. (shrink)

How to argue about politics -- Science: a consumer's guide -- The philosophical limits of science -- The new atheism -- Religious agnosticism -- Happiness, work, and capitalism -- Capitalism and education -- Thinking about art -- Can we stop arguing about abortion?

Philosophers of language and metaethicists are concerned with persistent normative and evaluative disagreements – how can we explain persistent intelligible disagreements in spite of agreement over the described facts? Tim Sundell recently argued that evaluative aesthetic and personal taste disputes could be explained as metalinguistic negotiations – conversations where interlocutors negotiate how best to use a word relative to a context. I argue here that metalinguistic negotiations are neither necessary nor sufficient for genuine evaluative and normative disputes to occur. A (...) comprehensive account of value talk requires stronger metanormative commitments than metalinguistic negotiations afford. (shrink)

Despite myriad controversies about reasons, two theses are frequently taken for granted: (i) reasons are sources of normative support for actions, attitudes, etc; and (ii) reasons, at least in simple, paradigmatic cases, consist in atomic facts. Call this conjunction “the atomic view.” Against this, we advocate what we call “the cluster view,” on which even in the simplest cases, the normative support for an action or attitude is typically provided by a whole cluster of facts. Moreover, many of these (...) facts are on an explanatory par—they each play the same kind of role in explaining why there is normative support for the action or attitude in question. We show that presupposition of the atomic view generates unnecessary (psuedo-)puzzles⁠—about topics such as rationality, moral worth, and doxastic justification⁠—that can be largely (dis)solved with the cluster view in place. The cluster view’s ability to do this constitutes an argument in its favor, beyond intuitive considerations that we also adduce. (shrink)

One natural way to argue for the existence of some subjective constraint on agents’ obligations is to maintain that without that particular constraint, agents will sometimes be obligated to do that which they lack the ability to do. In this paper, I maintain that while such a strategy appears promising, it is fraught with pitfalls. Specifically, I argue that because the truth of an ability ascription depends on an (almost always implicit) characterization of the relevant possibility space, different metaethical accounts (...) take obligation to be constrained by different senses of ability. As a result, what initially looks to be a point of consensus—that ability constrains obligation—turns out to be a point of contention, and arguments with this at the foundation are much more likely to obscure, rather than resolve, metaethical disputes. Despite this, appeals to ability in metaethics aren’t doomed to be fruitless. On the contrary, if we can independently establish a particular sense of ability as the normatively relevant one, then we have good grounds for ruling out metaethical accounts that are inconsistent with it. In the final section, I make just such an argument. What seems right about the thought that ability constrains obligation is that an agent cannot be obligated to do that which her circumstances prevent her from doing. I argue that only a sense of ability that is both epistemically and motivationally restricted adequately respects the limits of agential control. (shrink)